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) 
[L. A. No. 25119. In Bank. Apr. 22, 1959.] 
THE PEOPLE et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF LONG 
BEACH, Respondent. 
[1] M1lDicipal Oorporations-Propeny-Tidelanda-Grant to Oity 
by State.-The specific purpose set forth in the 1935 statute 
amending the trust terms of a grant to the city of Long Beach 
of the state's interest in tide and submerged lands within the 
city's corporate limits to promote "the moral and social wel-
fare of Beamen, naval officers and enlisted men, and other 
persons engaged in and about the harbor and eommerce, 
fishery and navigation" (Stats. 1935, ch. 158, p. 794), is not 
only eonsistent with but in direct aid of the basic trust pur-
pose set out in the original grant to establish and maintain 
a harbor and necessary or eonvenient related facilities for 
the "promotion and accoD11llodation of commerce and naviga-
tion" (Stats. 1911, ch. 676, p. 1305). Personnel are as vital 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, § 456 et seq. 
licK. Dig. References: [1,2] Municipal Corporations, § 383; [3) 
Stnte of California, § 33; [4, 5] Municipal Corporations, § 385. 
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to these activities as the ships and othcr facilities used there-
in, and no distinction can properly be drawn betwcen provid-
in~ dormitories and other facilities for maritime personn('l 
and docks for ships, warehouses for goods, or convention, ex-
hibition, Rnd banquet halls for use by trade, shipping and 
cOlllmercial organizations. 
[2] Id.~Property-'1'idelands-Grant to Oity by State.-Promo-
tioll "of the moral and socinl welfare of seamen, naval otTIccrs 
and enlisted men, and other persons engaged in and about the 
harbor and commerce, fishery, and navigation" (Stats. 1935, 
ch. 158, p. 794), such as by construction of a building on a 
tideland site to be leased to the Y.M.C.A., is of sufficient local 
concern to justify the expenditure of purely municipal funds 
therefor, but as purposes of a trust for commerce, navigation 
and fishery they are also for the benefit for all the people 
of the state, and accordingly trust income may properly be 
devoted thereto. 
[3] State of California - Fiscal Ma.tters - Limitations - Gift of 
Public Funds.-Assuming that a grant in aid to a private 
organization is a "gift" to and "for the purpose and benefit 
of" such organization within the meaning of Const., art. IV, 
§§ 22 and 31, prohibiting such assistance to private institutions, 
even though the organization is thereby enabled to promote 
some public purpose, the performance of a bona fide contract 
by a public body is not the making of a gift, nor is it "for the 
purpose and benefit of" the private contractor within the mean-
ing of such constitutional provision, since if it were, the state 
would be powerless to contract with any organization not ex-
pressly exempted from the constitutional limitations. 
[4] Municipal Oorporations-Property-'1'idelands-Leases.-Pro-
posed construction of a building hy the city of Long Beach on 
tidelands granted the city by the state for trust purposes and 
lease of the building to the Y.M.C.A. for 25 years for contin-
ued operation of the Armed Services Y.M.C.A. does not amount 
to a grant in fee or appropriation of money to a private organ-
ization ",here the Y.M.e.A. receives only the use of the building 
for 25 years on condition that it at all times carl'Y out the truflt 
purposes for the public benefit under the city's supervision, 
its rights in the building terminating when it ceases to do so, 
where it can gain no monetary benefit from the leasc in view 
of thc fact that, other than the goodwill that it may engender 
for itself, the sole benefit it will derive is the ability to promote 
a public trust purpose that happens also to be its own, and 
'where the public benefit that will result from its operation 
of the facility at its own expense is elearly sufficient consider-
[3J See Ca1.Jur.2d, State of California, § 105; Am.Jur., Public 
Funds, § 61. 
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ation for it.s use of the buildin{; And such ineidp.ntnl Donmonc-
tnry bcnp.fits as it may rcc('ivc. 
[5] Id.-Property-Tidelands-Le&ses.-A proposed lease of a 
building by the city of Long Beach, to be constructed by the 
city on tidelands granted the city by the state for trust pur-
poses, is not objectionable as violating the civil service pro-
visions of the city charter on the ground that those provisions 
require the city to (,XE'Cui(' the trust purposes itself by means 
of civil service personnel, since administration of the tidelands 
trust for the benefit of all the people of the state is not a 
municipal affair, the statutes creating the trust and regulating 
its administration expressly authorize leases to promote its 
purposes, and accordingly any conflicting limitations in the 
city charter are inapplicable. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. A. Curtis Smith, Judge. Affirmed. 
Proceeding by city to secure a declaration of its right to 
use trust funds to construct a building on tidelands to be 
leased to the Y.M.C.A. Judgment approving proposed ex-
penditures and lease, affirmed. 
Stanley Mosk and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys General, 
Leonard M. Friedman, Assistant Attorney General, and F. G. 
Girard, Deputy Attorney General, for Appellants. 
Theodore R. Gabrielson as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Ap-
pellants. 
Walhfred Jacobson, City Attorney, O'Melveny & Myers 
and Pierce Works for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In 1911, the State of California granted 
to the city of Long Beach the tidelands and submerged lands 
lying within the city's boundaries in trust for certain uses and 
purposes connected with the development of Long Beach Har-
bor. (Stats. 1911, ch. 676, p. 1304.) The original grant 
stated "That said lands shall be used by said city and by its 
successors, solely for the establishment, improvement and 
conduct of a harbor, and for the construction, maintenance and 
operation thereon of wharves, docks, piers, slips, quays, and 
other utilities, structures and appliances necessary or conven-
ient for the promotion and accommodation of commerce and 
navigation, and said city, or its successors, shall not, at any 
) 
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time, grant, convey, givc or alien said lands, or any part 
thereof, to any individual, firm or ('orporation for any purpose 
whatsoever; p,·ovidcd, that said city, or its successors, may 
grant franchises thereon, for limited periods, for wharves 
and other public uses and purposes, and may lease said lands, 
or any part thereof, for limited periods, for purposes consist-
ent with the trusts upon which said lands are held by the 
Stat.e of California and with the requirements of commerce or 
navigation at said harbor .... " (Stats. 1911, ch. 676, p. 1305.) . 
The terms of the original trust were amended by the Legis-
lature in 1925 (Stats. 1925, ch. 102, pp. 235-236) and 1935. 
(Stats. 1935, ch. 158, pp. 793-795.) ! 
Following the discovery of oil under the tidelands in 1937,· 
it was determined in Oily of Long Beach v. Marshall, 11 Cal. 
2d 609 [82 P.2d 362], that the city had the right to produce 
oil and gas from these land!>, and in Oity of Long Beach v. 
MQrse, 31 Cal.2d 254 [188 P.2d 17], that the oil and gas 
revenue could be used only for trust purposes. In 1951, the 
Legislature found that approximately 50 per cent of the oil 
and gas revenue was no longer needed for trust purposes and 
declared such part of the revenue free from the public trust 
for navigation, commerce, and fisheries. (Stats. 1951, ch. 915, 
pp. 2444-2445.) In Mallon v. Oity of Long Beack, 44 Cal.2d 
199 [282 P.2d 481], it was determined that the state, not the 
city, was entitled to the revenue freed from the trust by its 
partial revocation. 
Thereafter the state brought an action against the city to 
recover the funds to which it was entitled under the decision 
in the Mallon case. In 1956 the Legislature took note of this 
litigation and concluded that the public interest would best 
be served by its prompt settlement. Accordingly, it authorized 
a settlement dividing the oil and gas revenue between the state 
and the city, and provided that the latter's share should con-; 
tinue to be held in trust and expended for trust purposes. It 
set forth a nonexclusive list of trust purposes that were 
declared to be matters of state, as distinguished from local,· 
interest and benefit, and it expressed its belief "that the Attor-
ney General and said city should seek judicial determinations 
further defining said city's rights and duties~in the premises." 
(Stats. 1st Ex. Sess. 1956, ch. 29.) Pursuant to this legisla-
tion a consent decree was entered settling the main points of 
dispute between the state and the city, but the trial court 
reserved jurisdiction to determine whether given proposed 
expenditures were or were not within the power of the city to 
) 
) 
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make as trustee in possession of its share of the oil and gas 
revenue. 
Thereafter the city commenced the present proceedings to 
secure a declaration of its right to use trust funds to construct 
a building to be leased to the National Board of the Young 
Men's Christian Association. The trial court entered judg-
ment approving the proposed expenditures and lease. The 
state appeals .. 
Since 1936 the Y.M.C.A. has been operating a facility known 
as the Armed Services Y.M.C.A. on tidelands leased from the 
city at a rental of $1.00 per year. This facility was erected 
without cost to the city, and the lease was executed pursuant 
to the 1935 amendment to the trust terms, which provided 
•• That nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to 
prevent •.. the leasing or use of such tidelands or submerged 
lands for limited periods for the construction, maintenance, 
and operation of nonprofit benevolent and charitable insti-
tutions organized and conducted for the promotion of the 
moral and social welfare of seamen, naval officers and enlisted 
men, and other persons engaged in and about the harbor and 
commerce, fishery, and navigation." (Stats. 1935, ch. 158, p. 
794.) Owing to freeway construction, the relocation of the 
Navy Landing, and soil subsidence, the Armed Services 
Y.M.C.A. requires a new building at a new location if it is to 
continue adequately to serve its purposes. The city proposes 
to construct this building on a tideland site with tideland 
revenue at a cost of over $900,000 and lease it for 25 years to 
the Y.M.C.A. for the continued operation of the Armed 
Services Y.M.C.A. 
The proposed lease provides that the "Lessee shall use the 
demised premises, together with the building and facilities 
located thereon, solely and exclusively for the purposes of, and 
it shall devote its special knowledge and experience to, manag-
ing, operating, conducting and maintaining therein and there-
on, without compensation for its services in so doing, a rest, 
recreation and entertainment center for the use and accommo-
dation of, and for the benefit and for the promotion of the 
moral and social welfare of, members of the Armed Forces of 
the United States, merchant seamen and other persons engaged 
in and about the harbor and in commerce and navigation .•.. " 
. It shall provide suitable dormitory and sanitary accommoda-
tions; adequate meal service; suitable entertainment; and 
"such additional services and facilities, including a social 
room, lounge, game room, lockers, showers, telephone booths, 
) 
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the meaning of section 22, for if it were, the state would be 
powerless to contract with any organization not expressly 
exempted from the constitutional limitations. 
[4] In the present case, the statc contends that the carry-
ing out of the city's plan must be regarded as a gift of the 
use of a valuable building for 25 years to the Y.M.C.A. to 
enable it to perform its private charitable purposes and that 
such a gift cannot be justified solely because a public purpose 
will also be served. The city contends that the benefits 
derived by the Y.M.C.A. are merely incidental to the public 
purpose and that the Y.M.C.A.'s performance of its obliga-
tions under the lease will constitute full and adequate consider-
ation for its use of the bUilding. 
County of Los Angeles v. Southern Calif. Tel. Co., 32 Cal. 
2d 378 [196 P.2d 773], compels the resolution of these con-
llicting contentions in favor of the city. In that case the 
court sustained the grant of a franchise to a public utility 
pursuant to Civil Code, section 536, and drew a distinction 
between such a grant and an absolute grant in fee or an 
appropriation of public money. "A franchise such as is author-
ized by section 536 is not an absolute grant in fee or an appro-
priation of money, but is merely a limited right to use the 
highways and only to the extent necessary for the furnishing 
of services to the public. Also, the privilege must be exer-
cised 'in such manner and at such points as not to incommode 
the public use of the road or highway.' (Civ. Code, § 536.) It 
is obvious that the right acquired by the company is of less 
substance than the transfers involved in the cited cases which 
condemn appropriations of money and grants in fee. 
"Moreover, the state is assured of a continuing benefit in 
return for the privilege granted under section 536, whereas 
this may not be true in transactions involving an outright 
appropriation or transfer in fee. The company must not only 
construct a telephone system but it must render service, and 
if it fails to do so the franchise terminates. Thus the state 
receives benefits during the life of the franchise, since in order 
to retain it the company must continue to serve the public. 
If and when the public benefit ceases and the franchisf expires, 
the state is in as good a position as it was before the limited 
privilege was granted. The building of a public utility and 
consequent benefit to the people may not be a sufficient con-
sideration to support a grant in fee, but it does not follow that 
the benefit received from the construction and continued opera-
tion of a telephone system is not an adequate consideration for 
• 
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the us!' of the highways so long as the public service con-
tinuel;." (32 Ca1.2d at 387-388.) 
In the present case there is also no grant in fee or 
appropriation of money to a private organization. The 
Y.M.C.A. receives only the use of the building for 25 years 
on condition tlmt at all times it carries out the trust purposes 
for the public benefit under the supervision of the city. When 
it ceases to do so its rights in the building terminate. More· 
over, it can gain no monetary benefit from the lease. Thus, 
other than the goodwill that it may engender for itself, the sole 
benefit it will derive is the ability to promote a public trust 
purpose that happens also to be one of its own. Under these 
circumstances, the public benefit that will result from the 
Y.M.C.A.'s operation of the facility at its own expense is 
clearly sufficient consideration for the Y.M.C.A.'s use of the 
building and such incidental nonmonetary benefits as it may 
receive. 
[5] Finally the state contends that the lease will violate 
the civil service provisions of the Long Beach city charter 011 
the ground that those provisions require the city to execute 
the trust purposes itself by means of civil service personnel. 
There is no merit in this contention. The administration of the 
tidelands trust for the benefit of all of the people of the state 
is not a municipal affair, and the statutes creating the trust 
and regulating its administration expressly authorize. leases 
to promote its purposes. Accordingly, any conflicting limita-
tions in the cit.y charter are inapplicable. (Oivic Center 
Assn. v. Railroad Com., 175 Cal. 441, 445 [166 P. 351]; 
Pasade'TI.a v. OharZevt1Ze, 215 Cal. 384, 388 [10 P.2d 745].) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., McComb, 
J., and Peters, J., concurred. 
